Article III of the Constitution of the United States guarantees that every person accused of wrongdoing has the right to a fair trial before a competent judge and a jury of one's peers.
Where the Executive and Legislative branches are elected by the people, members of the Judicial Branch are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Article III of the Constitution, which establishes the Judicial Branch, leaves Congress significant discretion to determine the shape and structure of the federal judiciary.
Even the number of Supreme Court Justices is left to Congress — at times there have been as few as six, while the current number nine, with one Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices has only been in place since The Constitution also grants Congress the power to establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court, and to that end Congress has established the United States district courts, which try most federal cases, and 13 United States courts of appeals, which review appealed district court cases.
Federal judges can only be removed through impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction in the Senate. Judges and justices serve no fixed term — they serve until their death, retirement, or conviction by the Senate. By design, this insulates them from the temporary passions of the public, and allows them to apply the law with only justice in mind, and not electoral or political concerns.
Generally, Congress determines the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In some cases, however — such as in the example of a dispute between two or more U.
The courts only try actual cases and controversies — a party must show that it has been harmed in order to bring suit in court. This means that the courts do not issue advisory opinions on the constitutionality of laws or the legality of actions if the ruling would have no practical effect. Cases brought before the judiciary typically proceed from district court to appellate court and may even end at the Supreme Court, although the Supreme Court hears comparatively few cases each year.
Federal courts enjoy the sole power to interpret the law, determine the constitutionality of the law, and apply it to individual cases. The courts, like Congress, can compel the production of evidence and testimony through the use of a subpoena. The inferior courts are constrained by the decisions of the Supreme Court — once the Supreme Court interprets a law, inferior courts must apply the Supreme Court's interpretation to the facts of a particular case.
The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the land and the only part of the federal judiciary specifically required by the Constitution. Most state court judges—unlike federal judges—are elected, not appointed; and some have to be re-elected, or approved by the voters, every few years. Very few people think that federal judges should be elected.
There are, though, some critics of lifetime tenure: those critics say that lifetime tenure causes judges to stay in their positions longer than they should—after they have become too old to do their job well, either just because of age or because they are out of touch with modern times. Maybe, these critics say, judges should be appointed for a fixed term of years—say 14 or 18 years—with no chance of being reappointed.
But a change like this would almost certainly require a constitutional amendment, and the chance of its happening is extremely small.
Although the guarantee that judges will have lifetime tenure seems simple, it actually raises a difficult question in our system. In the federal government, there are many officials who do judge-like things—think of military courts-martial, for example—but who do not have the lifetime tenure that Article III seems to require for federal judges. Many of these officials are members of, or work for, administrative agencies—what is sometimes called the federal bureaucracy.
Officials like this will rule on whether, for example, a company has used advertisements that deceive consumers, or a business has wrongly tried to prevent its workers from joining a union, or the government has not paid a person the disability benefits he or she is entitled to.
These administrative officials usually serve only for a few years, after which the President can replace them. There are safeguards to prevent officials of this kind from being openly biased or unfair, but because they are appointed so frequently, they are often thought to be more responsive to day-to-day politics than judges are.
Why do we allow these officials to resolve disputes in the way that judges do, even though they do not have the lifetime tenure guarantee that judges have? The answer is complicated, but the basic idea is that you generally have a right to appeal from a decision of one of these officials to a judge whose independence is protected by lifetime tenure. So judges—including, potentially, the Supreme Court—will have the final word, and that, the Supreme Court has said, is enough to maintain the principle of judicial independence enshrined in Article III.
One part of the answer is easy: the federal courts have the power to decide certain cases and resolve certain controversies, in a neutral and objective way, by interpreting the relevant laws and applying them to the relevant facts.
Here, things get more complicated. However, as long as term-limited judges are allowed to take on senior status or otherwise serve the judiciary in some capacity while continuing to be fully compensated, there is every reason to think that term limits could be done by statute. Second, and more importantly, there is the question of whether statutory limits could be instituted retrospectively or only prospectively—in other words, if the current justices would be subject to the limit or if the limit would only apply to new justices.
The debate hinges on whether such a change redefines the nature of the position to which the justice was appointed, thereby creating constitutional issues. Term limits have received support from those on both sides of the political aisle, but some concerns remain. There are two leading policy objections to term limits: first, that they would cause greater instability in jurisprudence and second, that they would create incentives for judges near the end of the term to audition for, or cater their decisions to, their next position.
While these are indeed important considerations, neither objection outweighs the potential benefits of term limits. Regular upheavals in law have long been raised as a potential negative outcome to term limits. To a certain extent, some amount of change in doctrine is an expected and even necessary aspect of jurisprudence. But regular, wild shifts in a wide range of legal issues could have negative consequences for the stability of American law.
Ultimately, however, a term limit of nearly two decades is unlikely to contribute significantly to such upheavals, especially given that a respect for stare decisis—or precedent—continues to inform judicial decision-making as well as the reality that important lines of jurisprudence experience major changes even without such a reform. Recent research has examined how term limits could lead to more regular reversals of major decisions, particularly if individual justices largely ignore precedent.
The most notable evidence of this came when Chief Justice Roberts voted to strike down the anti-choice law at issue this term in June Medical v. Russo, proving that judges can break with their previous votes on an issue when clear precedent is at stake.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind the significant changes that have occurred within Supreme Court jurisprudence. For example, major cases challenging abortion rights and the promise of Roe v. Wade are regularly brought before the court. The holding in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey rewrote the constitutional standard under which abortion restrictions are tested, and Gonzales v. Any new justice on the court will have an effect on how precedent is evaluated as well as how novel legal questions are decided. However, most modern presidents have appointed between two and four justices—with the most common number being two, regardless of if the president served for one or two terms.
Bankruptcy judges receive the same annual salary, no matter where they serve or how many years of service. They are appointed to renewable year terms by a majority of the judges of the U. Court of Appeals for their circuit with assistance from the circuit council. The bankruptcy judge position was established in , and the appointment process is set by Judicial Conference policy, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of Bankruptcy judges must meet eligibility criteria, including being a member of the bar in good standing.
Circuit councils may appoint a merit selection panel, consisting of judges and other legal professionals, to review and recommend candidates for appointment. Bankruptcy judgeships are created pursuant to legislation enacted by Congress. Learn more about the history of bankruptcy judges from the following resources:.
Similar to senior status Article III judges, bankruptcy and magistrate judges may continue to provide judicial assistance after they have retired. Generally, recalled judges exercise all the powers and duties that they had as an active judge. Circuit councils determine whether there is a substantial need for recall services from bankruptcy and magistrate judges based on court workload.
In addition, recall requests that seek staffing or that cost more than a certain amount in additional salary and travel expenses must be approved by a Judicial Conference committee. Retired bankruptcy and magistrate judges are appointed for recall service for a specific period of time but no more than three years, which may be renewed. Visiting judges who may sit by designation and assignment in any other federal court having a need for their service.
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